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Violence and Civilization: Gramsci, Sorel, and Machiavelli 
Robert P. Jackson 
 
The writings of Antonio Gramsci are highly suggestive for re-thinking the meanings of violence. On 
the one hand, they aid us in understanding the intellectual history of the concept, in part due to the 
transmission of debates in the socialist movement about the role of violence from fin-de-siècle France 
to the context of Italy; for example, between the ‘hostile brothers’1 of Jean Jaurès and Georges Sorel. 
The evolution of the concept ‘violence,’ particularly in the hands of Gramsci, is an example of the 
‘translation’ of this French experience into the Italian movement and its active refashioning on a new 
terrain.2 On the other hand, Gramsci’s writings also illuminate an analysis of violence in his immediate 
historical context, namely the rising prominence (and rise to power) of regimes in the 1920s and 1930s 
that deployed means of, what he terms, ‘private violence.’3 This violence formed an unofficial part of 
strategies to obstruct the development of political tendencies that posed a threat to the dominant ruling 
groups.4 The originality of Gramsci’s thought is marked by his intertwining of these elements of 
historical perspective and engaged strategic analysis (motivated by an impassioned concern for the 
future). In order to benefit from this distinctive perspective, and because his views on the topic have 
been treated seldom in detail,5 I propose that the relatively neglected Gramscian perspective on violence 
is a fruitful complement to more widely circulating conceptions from this period, such as that advanced 
by Walter Benjamin in his Critique of Violence.6 
Gramsci’s mature writings in his Prison Notebooks provide a record of his philosophical 
encounter with two key theorists in respect to the development of his own position on questions of 
violence and civilization: Niccolò Machiavelli, the Florentine author of The Prince,7 and Sorel, the 
revolutionary syndicalist and author of Reflections on Violence.8 Sorel’s text is one that Gramsci read 
in its first edition,9 but with which he also engages in his later prison writings.10 The literature contains 
relatively few attempts to explore Gramsci’s relation to Sorel in detail.11 In contrast, Gramsci’s 
engagement with Machiavelli is one of the most celebrated aspects of his prison writings, and it has 
correspondingly provoked unprecedented levels of comment and scholarship.12 In this chapter, I will 
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restrict myself to examining briefly the meanings of violence in Gramsci in relation to each of these 
figures in turn. First, I will review Gramsci’s reading of Sorel. The latter’s ‘shocking conclusion,’13 as 
Jeremy Jennings points out, is that (a certain type of) violence is the only means of salvation to prevent 
the world from descending into barbarism. This proletarian violence, in the form of the political myth 
of the ‘General Strike,’14 is central to Sorel’s transformative project to turn ‘the men of today into the 
free producers of tomorrow working in workshops where there are no masters.’15 In these arguments, 
Sorel felt that he was completing the doctrine of Marx,16 in a way that had been impossible for the latter 
because Marx was not ‘acquainted with the facts’17 of subsequent economic conflicts and strikes. We, 
says Sorel, ‘have ideas about violence that it would have been difficult for him to form.’18 
Gramsci draws intellectual vitality for his own re-articulation of Marxism as a ‘philosophy of 
praxis’19 in part from the formative political and cultural influence that Sorel’s Reflections on Violence 
had on his generation in Italy. Indeed, Sorel was one of the ideological sources of the cultural movement 
of Italian Futurism, and his ideas helped to inspire its leading proponents, such as Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti.20 The worshipful celebration of energetic life force by this ‘first multi-disciplinary avant-
garde’21 is reflected, albeit critically, in Gramsci’s enduring engagement, in increasingly complex 
forms, with the ‘language of life’ in his later writings.22 Gramsci’s engagement with and criticism of 
the fusion of Marx with the diverse influences (including Henri Bergson, Émile Durkheim, Ernest 
Renan, and Friedrich Nietzsche, among others) found in Sorel’s work, helps to shape a number of the 
concepts in, what we might today call, the Gramscian conceptual toolbox. I will focus primarily on 
Sorel’s notion of the political myth. Building on Sorel’s distinction between myth (a ‘body of images 
capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments’23) and Utopia (a ‘deceptive image of the future’24), 
Gramsci transforms Sorel’s concept of political myth by marshalling resources acquired through the 
development of his reading of Machiavelli’s The Prince.25 Gramsci accepts Sorel’s case that only the 
political myth is able to mobilize the strongest inclinations of a people, to create a violent force that can 
cleave the social fabric. However, Gramsci criticises Sorel’s displacement of a confrontation with the 
difficulties, and perhaps dangers, involved in the concrete (programmatic) elaboration of the 
constructive aspect of this process onto the principle of the irrational. I argue that Gramsci’s 
‘translation’ of the predominantly negative and destructive moment of social cleavage identified by 
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Sorel in the form of the proletarian violence of the ‘General Strike’26 is realised through its 
transformation and synthesis with his evolving reading of Machiavelli. The summary or ‘précis’27 of 
this development is the notion of the modern Prince as a ‘myth-Prince,’28 which, as Peter Thomas 
explains, goes beyond the defensive moment to a ‘creative phase of the constitution ex-novo of a 
collective will that aims to institute genuinely new political forms.’29 Finally, I will indicate that 
Gramsci’s uses of the term violence, while significant in themselves, are also illuminating when read 
against the terms set out by Benjamin in his Critique of Violence. I will conclude by suggesting that we 
can use Benjamin’s distinction between ‘mythical’30 and ‘divine violence’31 as a means to evaluate the 
success of Gramsci’s re-invention of the constructive elements of the political myth as modern myth-
Prince. Its contemporary relevance may hinge on whether we can describe the wider project of the 
modern Prince more properly as a form of mythical violence or as a form of divine power. 
 
Violence in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks 
 
The term ‘violence’ (violenza), along with its cognates, appears in Gramsci’s writings as part of the 
wider formation of his thought. This semantic field includes related concepts, such as the notions of 
coercion, brutality and force, as well as apparently opposing terms, such as consensus and education.32 
His considerations of violence take up a wide variety of themes: from discussions of religion33 as a ‘way 
of rationalising the world and real life,’34 popular unrest in the South of Italy during the Risorgimento,35 
and Machiavelli and anti-Machiavellianism in Italy,36 to violence in the Renaissance,37 the relation 
between Sorel and Jacobinism,38 and the connections between passion, economics and politics.39 In the 
critical edition of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, the term ‘violence’40 makes twenty-nine appearances in 
twenty-five distinct notes. This is a rather small quantity of appearances, relative to the more canonical 
concepts in his lexicon (such as hegemony, subalternity, civil society, and common sense).41 However, 
this slight number belies the significant role that notions associated with ‘violence’ play in his approach 
to some complex issues. Thus, as Guido Liguori points out, the understanding of violence associated 
with Sorel’s ‘spirit of cleavage’42 strongly contributes to ‘forming Gramsci’s specific attention to 
revolutionary subjectivity.’43 Gramsci bases his distinctive theory of subjectivity on the historical 
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formation of persons and personality, not simply in a juridical sense, but in a wider ethico-political 
articulation.44 This is particularly the case, as we will see, when Gramsci addresses the role of political 
myth in the organization of popular passions and sentiment. 
From the very first appearance of the term violence in the Prison Notebooks (approximately 
February 1929),45 during a literature review entitled ‘Sundry Bibliography,’46 Gramsci’s interest in the 
concept is immersed in the French political and cultural situation. We find a discussion of Sorel’s 
connection to the ‘Proudhon Circle’47 in close proximity to his wider concern with the historical 
development of Action française, the far-right grouping led by Charles Maurras. In further discussion 
of some literature that he regards as marginal, Gramsci refers to the advocacy of the use of violence 
against the workers as a ‘sign of the times.’48 In June/July 1930, Gramsci addresses the thematic issue 
of spontaneity and leadership within the ‘history of subaltern classes.’49 In the context of assessing 
Henri De Man’s studies of folklore and the history of popular psychology, Gramsci also refers to 
traditions ‘severed by violence,’50 demonstrating a cultural usage of the term. Gramsci is not concerned 
with the preservation of, often superstitious, folklore for its own sake. He seeks to elaborate a political 
education based on popular experience, rather than one drawn into conflict with science and modern 
theory. Gramsci argues that education, or political leadership, must devote ‘itself to real people in 
specific historical relations, with specific sentiments, ways of life, fragments of worldviews, etc.,’51 if 
it is to be ‘living’52 and ‘historically effective.’53 Far from disdaining or neglecting popular thought, 
Gramsci hopes to awaken among the passive elements of society a ‘consciousness of themselves as 
creators of historical and institutional values.’54 Gramsci aims to raise this critical awareness by making 
more coherent the ‘spontaneous philosophy’55 found in the language, common sense, religion and 
folklore of the subaltern groups. His ambitious overall project is to develop the ‘intuitions of a future 
philosophy,’56 which could be the germ of a new form of culture, and ultimately a united human 
civilization. So, we might ask the question: what is the role, according to Gramsci, of violence, and 
more specifically of different types of violence, in this project? How does he envisage the process of 
differentiation or ‘cleavage’ in society—the destruction of ‘existing moral and juridical relations,’57 and 
the ‘positive phase’58 of the construction of new forms that might follow? 
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Prior to addressing these questions, the multiplicity of Gramsci’s use of the term ‘violence’ is 
of interest in itself. He discusses instances of violence of a straightforwardly physical nature; for 
example, in reference to the suppression of the Paris Commune, ‘the popular blood-letting of 1871.’59 
Yet, as we have seen above, his usage of the term violence is also concerned with the severing of 
traditions, such as those embedded in folklore. Gramsci considers more subtle, structural forms of 
violence represented by the processes of dispersion and fragmentation of the traditions of subaltern 
groups. Gramsci’s reflections are thus also sensitive, through his conception of civil society, to the de-
centralized and pre-conscious forms of coercion that actively constitute the passivity of subaltern groups 
at all levels including discourse.60 This embraces elements akin to, what we might describe today in 
Bourdieusian terms as, ‘symbolic violence.’61 This discursive element of Gramsci’s thought, perhaps 
deploying his linguistic training,62 was later to become a rather exclusive focus of the reading of 
Gramsci advanced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their formulation of a new radical-
democratic politics.63 Gramsci also considers cultural movements in broad historical terms, such as the 
creative forces unleashed in Italy during the early Renaissance period, which ‘was much more violent 
than in France.’64 Gramsci appears to combine these physical (personnel) and cultural (tradition) modes 
in a note on Japanese culture (October/November 1930), when he discusses Christianity in Japan, which 
was ‘violently extirpated in the early decades of the seventeenth century.’65 Most interesting perhaps is 
the coercion or implicit violence involved in Gramsci’s analysis of the micro-dynamics of social 
transformations. In particular, the ‘molecular’ processes of transformation and conformism that become 
increasingly rapid and extensive under conditions of modernity.66 In this sense, we might also consider 
Gramsci’s discussion of the ‘crisis of adaption’67 that labourers undergo in conforming to the coercively 
applied rationalised production techniques of Fordism and Taylorism.68 In a note entitled ‘Passion and 
Politics’ (February 1933), Gramsci discusses a further example of violence in relation to his 
abovementioned theory of personality. Deliberating on the role of status and rank in human behaviour, 
he gives the example of a soldier on guard duty: ‘If someone has a duty to do for a certain length of 
time and is not relieved at the proper time he gets angry and even reacts with extreme…violence.’69 
Gramsci continues, ‘[t]hat in these episodes there is a manifestation of “personality” means only that 
the personality of a lot of men is mean and narrow but it is still personality.’70 For Gramsci, there are 
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forces that tend to keep personality among the mass of the population restricted to this narrow level, 
which, while appearing trivial, can result in reactions ‘in which life and personal liberty are put in 
jeopardy.’71 
While Gramsci’s writings intersect with the theme of violence across a range of topics too wide 
to address in a single chapter, his discussions return repeatedly to, and are often flanked by, his 
reflections on the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Sorel. It is for this reason that I will focus on 
Gramsci’s conception of violence in its relation to his readings of these two thinkers. Gramsci founds 
his overall assessment on a theoretical framework that rests on, what he calls, ‘the “dual perspective”72 
in political action and the life of the State.’73 This multifaceted theory appears in Gramsci’s writings 
with particular reference to Machiavelli: 
 
The dual perspective can present itself on various levels, from the most elementary to the most 
complex; but these can all theoretically be reduced to two fundamental levels, corresponding 
to the dual nature of Machiavelli’s Centaur—half-animal and half-human. They are the levels 
of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, of the individual 
moment and of the universal moment (“Church” and “State”), of agitation and of propaganda, 
of tactics and of strategy, etc.74 
 
I would suggest that in its guise as a nexus of violence and civilization,75 this dual perspective is key to 
an understanding of the construction of Gramsci’s emancipatory project and its relation to the thought 
of Sorel and Machiavelli.76 
 
Sorel, Gramsci, and Violence 
 
It is something of an understatement to argue that an efficacious deployment of Sorel’s terminology in 
the present conjuncture requires a preliminary work of intellectual archaeology. For Sorel, the question 
of the meanings of violence goes to the heart of much wider social concerns.77 Thus, he explains, in the 
introduction to the first publication of his Reflections on Violence in the syndicalist newspaper Le 
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Mouvement Socialiste (1906), ‘if we wish to discuss socialism seriously, we must first of all investigate 
the functions of violence in present social conditions.’78 Following references in Marx, Sorel drew 
inspiration for his conception of the intellectual and moral renewal of civilization from Giambattista 
Vico’s New Science (first published in 1725 and republished in reworked form in 1744).79 In Vico’s 
cyclical conception of history, following a period of decadence, there is a break or return (ricorso) to a 
primitive phase.80 After the moral conservatism of his earliest writings, Sorel insisted that, in his own 
time, the syndicalist movement represented a new beginning in which everything was ‘instinctive, 
creative and poetic.’81 In this way, the question of moral renewal is central to Sorel’s thought. Indeed, 
the ‘intellectual and moral reform’82 of Sorel, a notion also found in the work of Benedetto Croce,83 is 
one of the elements that Gramsci preserves, albeit within a radically transformed matrix, in his 
conceptual toolkit. Sorel’s enthusiastic support for the Dreyfusard cause also illustrates the moral 
impulse animating his political thought.84 Sorel launched sharp criticisms of the parliamentary 
socialists, because of their moral weakness and, what he saw as, their betrayal of this movement. As 
Jennings explains, in the hands of these Third Republic politicians this cause ‘was turned [in Sorel’s 
view] into an excuse for careerism and political advancement by politicians only too ready to adorn 
themselves with the privileges of power.’85 
Commentators often remark upon Sorel’s oscillating support for diverse political tendencies, 
from the so-called ‘new school’86 of revolutionary syndicalism, to his fleeting engagement with young 
right-radical monarchists (which would later provide inspiration for Mussolini), and finally Sorel’s 
defence of Lenin and bolshevism. While generally regarded as a form of intellectual infirmity, Theodore 
Zeldin argues that these enthusiasms cast Sorel in the light of a distinctly modern figure.87 On this 
reading, Sorel’s apparently disparate succession of positions reflects something of the ubiquitous 
condition of modern life. Sorel’s refusal to settle for a conformism motivated by a ‘democratic’ middle 
ground seems to speak to the fragmented and increasingly polarized viewpoints that dominate our 
present conjuncture. From the Prison Notebooks, we can see that Gramsci had read in the journal Critica 
Fascista (September 15 1933) the review of a recent book that posed Sorel’s thought as a form of 
revolutionary conservatism.88 Despite his interest in conservatives such as Renan, or the irrationalist 
tendencies of Bergson and Nietzsche, Gramsci does not see Sorel as an ‘aristocratic rebel’89 of the 
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Nietzschean type.90 Recent scholarship on Sorel encourages us to examine not the well-known image 
of Sorel as an ‘enthusiast of violence,’91 but rather the ‘conceptual “topography” of Sorel’s methods.’92 
Sorel characterises his own method as ‘diremption,’93 which as Eric Brandom explains, ‘is an explicit 
attempt to escape a dialectical approach to social reality.’94 In so doing, Brandom argues, Sorel is 
making a ‘metaphysical choice for pluralism over unity,’95 which Sorel believes ‘better corresponds to 
the practice of scientific and historical work.’96 Moreover, Brandom points out that, for Sorel, there is 
an ‘intimate connection between rationalism and Statism.’97 While Gramsci accepts that Sorel’s ideas 
could potentially justify disparate practical attitudes, ‘due to the variety and the incoherence of his point 
of view,’98 Gramsci’s overall assessment is that Sorel held a ‘radical “liberalism” (or theory of 
spontaneity),’99 which prevented the domination of these conservative consequences. 
Gramsci’s first significant theoretical interest in the concept of violence (in November 1930) 
manifests itself, as so often in his Prison Notebooks, with an instruction to himself to study further 
Sorel’s views on violence and their connection with his anti-Jacobin sentiment. Thus, Gramsci says, 
‘[c]heck how Sorel reconciles his hatred for the Jacobins-optimists with his theories of violence. Sorel’s 
phillipics against the Jacobins are incessant. (See his “Lettre à M. Daniel Halévy” in Mouvement 
Socialiste, 16 August and 15 September 1907).’100 Gramsci returns to this topic in a later note (August-
December 1932),101 in which he considers the difficulties of giving an overall assessment of Sorel’s 
work. On the one hand, Gramsci explains Sorel’s ‘curious anti-Jacobinism—sectarian, mean and anti-
historical’102—as a product of the suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871, which ‘severed the 
umbilical cord between the “new people” and the tradition of 1793.’103 On the other hand, Gramsci 
regards Sorel as withholding from a full engagement in politics, placing himself above everyday 
struggles. According to Gramsci, Sorel is therefore to some extent guilty of the self-same crimes that 
he disdains in other intellectuals. Thus, for Gramsci, a ‘careful analysis’104 is required to distinguish 
between the superficial elements of his work and the substantial elements that ‘can be admitted to the 
circle of modern culture.’105 Sorel’s anti-Jacobin views find expression in his Reflections on Violence 
through his lengthy discussions of the history of the French Revolution. Sorel is supportive of Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s view of the Revolution, emphasising the continuity between the ancien régime and 
modern France.106 Gramsci takes issue with Sorel’s identification of the original Jacobin revolutionaries 
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of 1793 with the inheritors of this tradition, particularly those of the post-1848 generation. The latter 
are representatives of, what Gramsci elsewhere describes as, ‘mummified Jacobin ideologies.’107 For 
Gramsci, we should not conflate the abstract and utopian schemes of these inheritors with the real value 
of the non-mummified form of the original movement,108 which was, after all, responsible for the 
creation of the national-popular elements of the modern French republic. 
While Gramsci draws on Sorel for inspiration in his conception of political myth, for Gramsci, 
the myth he wishes to construct is not Sorel’s ‘General Strike,’109 but a ‘modern Prince’110: 
 
Machiavelli’s Prince could be studied as an historical exemplification of the Sorelian myth—
i.e. of a political ideology expressed neither in the form of a cold utopia nor as learned 
theorising, but rather by a creation of concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered 
people to arouse and organise its collective will.111 
 
Thus, Gramsci describes the modern Prince as a ‘myth-Prince’112 by fusing elements from Machiavelli 
and Sorel. Whereas Sorel seems predominantly concerned with the moment of intense experience 
(which he describes in terms of the vividness of colours),113 Gramsci is also concerned (in a manner 
that engages with the ‘post-Jacobin hegemony’114 of his own time) with elaborating a constructive 
moment that will endure. Thus, Gramsci argues that the myth-Prince is a dramatic fusion of a body of 
images that evokes the passions of the many, but one that is sustained in the formation of a collective 
will that is articulated in a coherent (that is, rational and effective) form. In this sense, the Brazilian 
philosopher Carlos Nelson Coutinho argues that Gramsci’s discussions of the modern Prince in the 
Prison Notebooks echo the writings of Rousseau on the ‘General Will’115 in an unacknowledged way. 
Gramsci’s engagement with Machiavelli and Sorel lend his conception of historical materialism a non-
conventional aspect, at least in the sense that it makes explicit an element that is not articulated by Marx 
and Engels, namely ‘politics as a privileged sphere for a possible intersubjective consensual 
interaction.’116 Coutinho argues that Gramsci’s work therefore bears some similarities with approaches 
taken by later figures such as Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas through their respective conceptions 
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of ‘action’ and ‘communicative action.’117 According to Countinho, Gramsci’s treatment has something 
to provide in this respect arising from the characteristically concrete nature of his treatment.118 
 
Conclusion: Gramsci, Sorel and Machiavelli 
 
Despite a tendency in some quarters119 to reduce Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to a theory of consent, 
his writings in the Prison Notebooks exhibit a deep concern with what he calls the ‘armour of 
coercion.’120 In his reflection on Machiavelli’s Centaur, Gramsci regards the half-animal and half-
human figure of the Centaur as symbolic of the aforementioned ‘dual perspective.’121 For Gramsci, 
political thought should seek to elaborate the dialectical unity of these two levels: the elements of both 
force and consent.122 The operation of a hegemonic project combines the coercive apparatuses of the 
State with the institutions of civil society. These institutions help to provide a consent for the rule of the 
dominant groups. Commentators frequently present Gramsci primarily as a thinker of civil society,123 
but this belies his concern to provide a unitary analysis of these two moments, criticizing any tendency 
to isolate and divorce them. Gramsci rather re-formulates the common-sense conception of the 
exteriority of this pair with a critical notion of their unity in the ‘integral state.’124 For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is of interest that Gramsci elaborates a series of conceptual pairings: ‘of force and of 
consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization.’125 In this chain of couples, violence 
appears, on the one hand, in a prosaic sense as something anathema to culture or civilization. Yet, on 
the other hand, Gramsci’s analyses also subversively seek to reveal the violence (or perhaps the fraud) 
within existing civilizations. Consequently, the critical conception of violence reveals its positive non-
extortionate meaning as the necessity of the negation of the existing order and the prospect of the 
construction of not only a new State, but the germ of a new culture, and ultimately a new form of 
civilization. Thus, violence takes on an ambiguous moral sense, remaining partly pejorative in the 
conventional sense of the coercive brutality underwriting the existing hegemonic project, but also, as 
we have seen with Sorel, as a potentially redemptive element of revolutionary violence in the emergence 
of a new civilization. For Gramsci, this founding would involve both the physical cleaving of the social 
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fabric, but also, and perhaps more significantly, the overcoming of the incoherence of the subaltern 
groups imposed by the ‘symbolic violence’ of civil society. 
Gramsci describes a type of violence that arises as a function of the dominant group’s 
hegemonic project through the imposition of its own ‘present.’ In this process, as Peter Thomas 
explains, the subaltern groups experience an ‘incoherent present,’126 or a ‘non-presence of the 
present.’127 Deriving inspiration from Canto X of Dante’s Inferno, in which Cavalcante de’ Cavalcanti 
suffers the torment of not knowing whether his son is living or dead, and perhaps from his own 
experiences in prison, Gramsci theorises the nightmare-like situation of non-contemporaneity of the 
subaltern groups. For Gramsci, it is characteristic of the passive condition of subalternity to endure this 
living hell. As Thomas has shown, Gramsci’s reading of Machiavelli during the different phases of his 
prison writings evolves in parallel with the development of his novel contribution to Dante studies, 
which focuses on the figure of Cavalcanti.128 The non-contemporaneity of the subaltern groups involves 
the violence of having a social identity coercively constituted from a bizarrely composite and incoherent 
series of elements of different conceptions of the world. These groups are, in terms evoking the 
archaeological practices of later thinkers like Foucault, living in the present like a fossil, a walking 
anachronism.129 It is only through the irruption of a positive revolutionary violence that the subalterns 
can emerge from the margins of history to achieve an autonomous position, and an awareness of their 
own historical personality. For Gramsci, following Machiavelli, a utopian blueprint cannot form the 
basis of this transformation of society through which the subalterns can achieve this cathartic passage 
to the ethico-political moment of autonomy. Gramsci’s analysis of the ‘integral state,’130 as with 
Machiavelli’s analysis of the Prince, can effect a new foundation only to the extent that it is in fact the 
organic development of already-existing elements within the situation. In the tradition of Sorel, Gramsci 
argues that only the political myth is able to mobilize the strongest inclinations of a people, to create an 
emancipatory violence that can cleave the social fabric. Gramsci’s methodology seeks to avoid rigid 
schemata and derives historically his criteria of political interpretation. Thus, in order to deploy the 
insights of Machiavelli’s Prince as a ‘living’ work in the conditions of modernity, he suggests that we 
must make some quite significant modifications. Machiavelli’s notion of a Prince is the personification 
of a collective will in an individual figure embodying particular prowess in leadership. By contrast, for 
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Gramsci, the complexity of modern society renders insufficient any notion of political leadership by an 
individual figure. A modern Prince would therefore require the constitution of a social organism that 
would be able to negotiate the processes of, what Gramsci calls, the molecular transformations that take 
place on the complex terrain of contemporary politics. 
In Gramsci’s articulation of the modern Prince, we find not simply a synonym for the 
Communist Party, but an experiment in organizational form that engages with a much wider project of 
civilizational renewal. Gramsci expresses this project in terms that relate to Sorel’s conception of 
violence, but which are, in Gramsci’s hands, fundamentally transformed. Thus, Gramsci’s modern 
Prince ‘must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, 
which also means creating the terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective 
will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern civilisation.’131 We can evaluate 
Gramsci’s exploratory mapping of the terrain for the creation of these new forms of political 
organization using the test provided by Walter Benjamin in his Critique of Violence, between 
‘pernicious’132 forms of mythical violence and a ‘sovereign’133 or divine power. I would suggest that 
Gramsci’s destructive/constructive notion of political myth as modern Prince, when articulated in its 
widest sense as an intellectual and moral reform, can be understood as a form of suture of, or perhaps a 
dual perspective on, the distinction between ‘pure divine violence’134 and the ‘mythical, law-making 
violence,’135 which is articulated by Benjamin. Regardless of whether or not this speculatively asserted 
answer is sustainable without a practical demonstration of its efficacy, I would suggest that the fertility 
of the comparison affirms the more limited aim of indicating that Gramsci’s writings remain a rich 
repository for re-thinking violence in relation to the political and the ethical. 
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